0% of indexed voting power
$STATE/$DEEP Unification Proposal: Migrate Deepstate to 2DEEP Governance, Rewarder V3, and Protocol-Owned Liquidity
PROPOSED BY
The goal of this proposal is to resolve the technical and governance debt created by the initial protocol design. This proposal will eliminate $STATE, the vault, and $DEEP in favor of $2DEEP as the protocol's single token. We will immediately launch the new token with liquidity in a Uniswap v4 pool. Holders will be able to redeem both $DEEP and $STATE directly for $2DEEP.
Rewards will be reduced by approximately 90%, and we will gain the ability to add new markets autonomously. Rewarder V3 will also account for the width of the market spread when calculating rewards. This design requires DGP-001 and DGP-002 to be rejected.
This proposal atomically migrates Deepstate governance from STATE to the new capped, vote-enabled 2DEEP token, provided DGP-001 and DGP-002 remain unexecuted. At execution, the executor selects a salt; the first action deploys 2DEEP and its Governor and initializes a fresh USDG Uniswap v4 pool at exactly $0.01, all of which reverts atomically if that candidate pool is already initialized. Execution then records the live STATE conversion ratio and liabilities in a dedicated conversion contract referenced immutably by 2DEEP before deploying and funding the initial Rewarder V3. The conversion snapshot excludes unissued DEEP held by Rewarder V1, and the first authorized 2DEEP mint creates floor(L × 30 / 70) in a noncancelable, recipient-transferable, one-year linear Sablier stream so Deepstate Inc receives 30% of liability-plus-endowment issuance. The token's built-in redemption methods convert legacy DEEP one-for-one and STATE at the registered DEEP-per-STATE ratio without further endowment issuance or a time deadline, but each redemption is subject to the same 3-billion total-supply cap as every other mint; governance may raise or lower that cap, and setting it below current supply blocks every mint without reducing existing balances. Its sole role-authorized external mint function automatically adds a separate 30/70 one-year stream for two years beginning with the proposal's initial Rewarder mint, then continues without that allocation after the term expires.
Execution clears the live USDG/NVDA book within hard 1,000 USDG and 5 NVDA contribution limits, harvests the complete redeemable USDG and NVDA balances from the STATE vault, leaves Rewarder V1 ownerless and unable to accrue, installs Rewarder V3 with a 100 million 2DEEP program over 365 days, and converts all recovered NVDA to USDG subject to a 90%-of-30-minute-TWAP minimum output. Rewarder V3 scales its time- and quantity-adjusted emissions by the live market spread, paying 100% at zero ticks, 10% at 10,000 ticks, and zero at the maximum signed-32-bit spread along an inverse-log curve; every top change checkpoints both sides under the previous spread before the new rate begins. Future Rewarder V3 removal atomically freezes accrual and burns every token not already rewarded to an order, leaving exact funding for outstanding claims. Up to 1 million harvested USDG is paired with automatically minted 2DEEP across Governor-owned Uniswap v4 positions—40% from $0.001-$0.01, 40% from $0.005-$1.00, and 20% full-width—while excess USDG goes directly to the new Governor; any failed takeover, harvest, swap, liquidity, or authority transition reverts the entire execution. Finally, the proposal opens 2DEEP proposal submission three days after deployment, with a three-day voting delay, seven-day voting period, snapshot-based percentage quorum, and prior-timepoint proposal thresholds; transfers Factory ownership, protocol administration, and fees to the new Governor; appoints the Deepstate treasury multisig as the Factory operator for rapid market deployment and removal; revokes every known legacy-DEEP minter and permanently sinks legacy-DEEP administration into the token's own inaccessible contract address; caps initial 2DEEP supply at 3 billion unless governance changes it; and hardens the deprecated Governor with a 30-day voting delay, 30-day voting period, seven-day late-quorum extension, and 100% quorum.
CAST 0 STATE OF VOTING POWER
VOTING ENDED · EXECUTED